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COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY LAWYERS'
PRESENCE IN THE GRAND JURY ROOM:
RULES TO PREVENT ABUSE
Although the grand jury process is reserved for enforcement of
criminal laws and may not be used as a subterfuge to obtain evidence
for a civil or agency investigation,' it has become increasingly avail-
able to federal agencies for regulatory and civil enforcement. If
the original grand jury investigation is initiated in good faith for
only criminal enforcement purposes, then evidence developed by
that jury may be used by an agency in subsequent or concurrent
civil proceedings if the agency shows a "particularized need" for it.2
Use in administrative proceedings is an unsettled question.3
The dangers of secret grand jury information leaking to federal
agencies and of unauthorized agency use of that information have
increased in recent years because of the asserted need for agency
personnel to provide expertise and assistance to United States at-
torneys handling complex grand jury investigations. Since such
technical assistance requires disclosure of grand jury materials to
the agency personnel, rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure-designed in 1945 to protect grand jury secrecy-posed a
potential obstacle.4 In response to confficting decisions and requests
for clarification from the courts,5 the Supreme Court proposed an
I See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); In re
April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. Doe,
341 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
2 Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 99 S. Ct. 1667 (1979);
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
3 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-93 (1977) (testimony of Prof. Wayne LaFave) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]; Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Cor-
porate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 Hanv. L. REv. 1227, 1317 (1979).
4 The original version limited disclosure of grand jury matters to "attorneys
for the government," which courts construed not to include agency experts or
attorneys. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962).
The precise language of old rule 6(e) read in pertinent part: "Disclosure of
matters occurring before the -grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote
of any juror may be made to attorneys for the government for use in the performance
of their duties." FED. R. Cmn. P. 6(e).
5 See, e.g., Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp.
1098, 1126 n.54 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53
F.R.D. 464, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1971). For a comprehensive survey of the judicial
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amendment to rule 6(e) that would permit disclosure to n&essary
agency assistants.
6
After delaying implementation of the amendment and holding
hearings, Congress apparently decided that the risk of unauthorized
agency use of disclosed material was outweighed by the benefits of
such technical assistance.7 A modified, "compromise" S version of
rule 6(e) was adopted in 1977 which (1) permitted agency assistance
at the discretion of the government attorney who was prosecuting, 9
(2) required a record of all agency personnel so employed, 10 and (3)
imposed a contempt sanction for breach of grand jury secrecy."
decisions which preceded the amendment of rule 6(e), see Note, Administrative
Agency Access to Grand Jury Material Under Amended Rule 6(e), 29 CASE W. REs.
L. REv. 295, 297-314 (1978).
6The Supreme Court amendment to rule 6(e) inserted a new clause after the
sentence quoted in note 4, supra: "For purposes of this subsection, 'attorneys for
the government' includes . . . such other government personnel as are necessary to
assist the attorneys for the government in the performance of their duties." COM-
MUNICATIONS FROM THE CIIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNTED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 464,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1976).
7See Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1319.
8 Note, supra note 5, at 314.
9 FED. R. Cum. P. 6 (e) (2,)(A) (ii).
l0 Id. 6(e)(2)(B).
11Id. 6(e)(1). As amended, rule 6(e) provides in pertinent part:
Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure.
(1) General Rule.-A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony,
an attorney for the Government, or any person to whom disclosure is made
under paragraph (2) (A) (ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters
occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these
rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in
accordance with this rule. A knowing violation of rule 6 may be punished
as a contempt of court.
(2) Exceptions.-
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters
occurring before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote
of any grand juror, may be made to-
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of
such attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an
attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government
in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce Federal
criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under sub-
paragraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury
material for any purpose other than assisting the attorney for the govern-
ment in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce Federal
criminal law. An attorney for the government shall promptly provide the
district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury whose material
has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom such dis-
closure has been made.
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These were deliberate safeguards, included with the expectation
of prohibiting such agency personnel from using the disclosed ma-
terial for any purpose other than assisting the United States at-
torney.'2  The 1977 amendments were thus designed to facilitate
the United States attorney's task of interpreting complex records
and testimony: they were certainly not calculated to facilitate use
of grand jury materials by federal agencies in civil matters. Indeed,
subparagraph (2)(C)(i) of the amended rule continues the preexist-
ing requirement that any subsequent use of grand jury material
must be approved by a judge.
13
Nevertheless, a recent flurry of litigation suggests that Con-
gress's 1977 amendments did not close off all avenues of abuse.
The recent cases demonstrate that another way agency personnel can
obtain access to the grand jury is by appointment as special attorneys
to assist in conducting the proceeding itself.14 The United States
attorneys have made such appointments under 28 U.S.C. § 515(a),
which allows "any attorney specifically appointed" to "conduct
any kind of legal proceeding, . . . including grand jury proceed-
ings." 15  Cases challenging such appointments have thus had to
address not only rule 6(e), but also this section 515(a) appointment
power.
In one such case the court observed, "Although the propriety
of [administrative] agency attorneys appearing before the grand jury
as special assistant U.S. attorneys has been frequently questioned
in recent months, the question has not yet been conclusively re-
solved. It is of considerable importance to the administration of
criminal justice." 16 Still, that court, along with at least two
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters
occurring before the grand jury may also be made-
(ii) When permitted by a court at the request of the defendant,
upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury.
id. 6(e).
121d. 6(e)(2)(B).
1 3 FED. R. Cund. P. 6(e)(2)(C)(i).
14 United States v. Birdman, No. 78-1940 (3d Cir. June 25, 1979); In re
Perlin, 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978); In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas, 573
F.2d 936, rev'd en bana, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
1277 (1979); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. II1. 1979); United
States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
1528 U.S.C. §515(a) (1976).
16 In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260, 262 (7th Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted).
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others,' 7 held that the appearance of an agency lawyer before a grand
jury investigating alleged violations comparable to those investi-
gated by the lawyer within his agency, even when the lawyer him-
self had recommended the criminal prosecution, was not an abuse
of the grand jury. These decisions are troubling because they con-
strue the recent amendments to rule 6(e)-which Congress carefully
designed to provide controlled agency access to grand jury materials
-as support for granting access to the grand jury room itself.
The central thesis of this Comment is that the physical presence
of agency attorneys in the grand jury room and their actual con-
duct of the proceedings pose risks of abuse different in kind and
magnitude than those accepted by Congress when it allowed mere
disclosure of grand jury records and transcripts. Proper analysis
of the agency attorney as special attorney must, it is suggested, begin
with rule 6(d), which expressly limits who may be present and does
not directly mention agency attorneys.' 8 Recent cases in which
the presence of an agency attorney was challenged but upheld,
however, have completely ignored this section and looked solely to
rule 6(e), thereby confusing presence with disclosure. This Com-
ment will show that, at the least, Congress did not intend that its
rule 6(e) amendments would affect rule 6(d). It foresaw United
States attorneys drawing on the expertise of agency lawyers, but
not using them in their stead as prosecutors. This Comment
suggests that, to clarify the law, new rules be drafted that would
exclude all but necessary and appropriate agency attorneys from the
grand jury room. Such rules would seek to balance the competing
policies of effective criminal investigation and grand jury secrecy,
17United States v. Birdman, No. 78-1940 (3d Cir. June 25, 1979); United
States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
18 Rule 6(d) provides:
Who May Be Present. Attorneys for the government, the witness
under examination, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of
taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording device may
be present while the grand jury is in session, but no person other than
the jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting.
FED. R. C an. P. 6(d). The term "attorneys for the government" is defined in
rule 54(c):
Application of Terms. As used in these rules the following terms have
the designated meanings .... "Attorney for the government" means the
Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a
United States Attorney, an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney
and when applicable to cases arising under the laws of Guam means the
Attorney General of Guam or such other person or persons as may be
authorized by the laws of Guam to act therein ....
FED. R. Cam. P. 54(c).
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producing a compromise similar to the one achieved in the amended
rule 6(e).
I. AGENCY MOTTVATION: AN INTRODUCTION
Why agency lawyers want to be present at grand jury pro-
ceedings depends, of course, upon the circumstances. When the
agency lawyer has initiated the investigation by suggesting it to the
Justice Department, his motives may run from a personal vendetta 19
to an interest in seeing the investigation carried out correctly.
Another motive, however, is suggested by the extraordinary investi-
gatory powers available to the grand jury.20 The temptation for an
agency to recommend grand jury investigations with the hope of
getting information useful for its regulatory and civil activities
would seem substantial, especially when the target of an administra-
tive investigation has successfully resisted an agency's own sub-
poenas.21
A. Agency and Grand Jury Powers Compared
Not only do grand jury subpoenas receive little judicial scrutiny,
but a witness before a grand jury also enjoys few protections while
testifying; 22 further, the investigation need not concentrate on a
specific target. Such powers may be viewed as tempered by the
requirement that an indictment be issued by the defendant's peers,
23
by the seriousness with which society views criminal behavior, by
the opportunity the defendant has for vindication at trial, and by
the policy of secrecy which protects innocent targets who are not
indicted from disclosure to the public that they were suspected.
19 See Address by Attorney General (later Supreme Court Justice) Jackson,
Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (April 1940), quoted in
M. FRNxmL & G. N -'TALis, THE GRAND Jtry, AN INSfTrTmoN oN TnL&L 58
(1977).
2oUnited States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); United States v.
Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 510 (1943). See Note, Administrative Agency Access to
Grand Jury Materials, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 162, 176-78 (1975).
21Agency subpoenas are appealable. The agency will be required to show
"(1) that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose,
(2) that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, (3) that the information
sought is not already within the [agency's] possession, and (4) that the adminis-
trative steps required by [Congressional guidelines] have been followed." United
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). Under this standard, many agency
subpoenas have been successfully resisted. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,
April, 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103, 1106 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 1533 (1979).
22United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Fm. R. Cmm. P. 6(d).
But -see U.S. Considers a Grand Jury Switch, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 6, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
23 See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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None of these compensating factors or safeguards applies to
agency investigations. The regulatory activities of the agencies,
for example, unlike those of the United States attorney in connec-
tion with a given prosecution, are ongoing, so that vindication at
trial does not serve as a meaningful protection in cases of abuse. 24
The potential for harassment, short of litigation, thus presents a
problem.25 Congress has determined, therefore, not to give ad-
ministrative agencies investigatory powers comparable to those of
the grand jury.26 Because of this disparity, the Supreme Court
decided long ago that use of the grand jury for solely administrative
investigative purposes "flouted the policy of the law." 27 One com-
mentator articulated the rationale:
To the extent that access is gained to information unob-
tainable by the use of the agencies' own investigative pro-
cedures, the limits on agency power which Congress sought
to build into the statutes are circumvented....
Aside from congressional policy, restrictions on agency
investigations are fundamental to our liberties. The grand
jury is properly an arm of the court, not the executive.
The agencies are denied unrestrained inquisitorial powers
comparable to the grand jury's, because that kind of power
should not be vested in the executive branch. Expansion
of agency power through indirect access to grand jury ma-
terial permits the executive to wield such power.
28
Such concerns are enhanced when one considers the recent exploita-
tion of executive agencies in the Nixon Administration, which used
them to harass and punish political enemies of the President.
29
Grand juries were similarly used.30 In light of such abuses, it would
seem unwise indeed to expand the powers of agency investigation
or to facilitate the conjunctive use of grand juries and agencies as
political weapons.
A subsidiary, but nonetheless significant, objection to use of
the grand jury for civil investigation -is that it erodes the secrecy
essential to grand juries, making the witness less willing to testify
2 4 Hearings, supra note 3, at 33 (testimony of Hon. Edward R. Becker).
25 Id. 181 (statement of Phylis S. Bamberger).
26 For a comprehensive comparison of the powers of grand juries and adminis-
trative agencies, see Note, supra note 20, at 175-83.
2 7 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
28 Note, supra note 20, at 178-79 (footnotes omitted).
29 Id.
80 See, e.g., L. CLAa, THE GaND JuRy: THE UsE AND ABUsE OF POLITICAL
PowEa (1975).
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openly. To the extent that witnesses fear that their testimony may
be used collaterally by a federal agency, their inhibitions are likely
to increase.81
B. The Problem
Despite these apparent dangers, some practicing lawyers con-
tinue to suspect that agencies recommend grand jury investigations
with the hope of indirectly getting information useful for their
regulatory and civil activities.82 The technique seemed so apparent
to Justice Whittaker that he remarked, "[I]t is obvious that such
could be, and probably has often been, the real purpose of grand
jury investigations." 88 What seems, at first, to be a Machiavellian
hypothesis, gains further credence if the claims of defendants in
recent cases are at all credible; in them, the defendants found them-
selves being investigated by the same agency attorney in concurrent
administrative and grand jury proceedings.
Some hard evidence of "subterfuge" was uncovered, for ex-
ample, in In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas ("General
Motors") .4 In General Motors, following the company's refusal
to submit to certain discovery, an attorney for the Internal Revenue
Service recommended to the Justice Department that a grand jury
investigation be undertaken. The attorney made clear in a letter
that the Service intended to seek access to evidence produced by
the grand jury for use in its concurrent civil proceedings.35 In the
B1 Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1313.
32 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 152 (testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum);
id. 181 (statement of Phylis S. Bamberger).
8
3 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 684 (1958)
(Whittaker, J., concurring).
84573 F.2d 936, rev'd en banc, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 1277 (1979).
35 The case of In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d
1103 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1533 (1979), also raises suspicions of
subterfuge. The defendants found it suspicious that they received grand jury
subpoenas soon after they had successfully quashed an IRS summons for the same
records. To buttress their allegation of bad faith, the defendants introduced into
evidence part 9267.4 of the Internal Revenue Manual, which until November 1977
stated as a general practice recommendation of a grand jury investigation when an
administrative criminal investigation was stymied. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to infer from this any illicit motive by the IRS in its civil
investigations. 581 F.2d at 1107 n.9.
While the defendants' claim was, indeed, speculative, the court was perhaps too
hasty in its dismissal of this evidence. The manual set forth the IRS's awareness of
the disparity between the grand jury's investigatory powers and its own. The
Service was certainly aware then that grand juries might profitably, if not legitimately,
be used for civil investigations.
The IRS recently reviewed its relationship with grand juries and again
sanctioned the practice of recommending them when "Eilt is apparent that the
1979]
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one case where an indictment has been dismissed because of agency
abuse, United States v. Gold,86 an Environmental Protection Agency
attorney actually used material that he had uncovered as a special
attorney in a grand jury investigation to influence as administrative
law judge's decision in a concurrent proceeding. Similar accusa-
tions have been made in In re Perlin 37 and United States v. Bird-
man,38 in which the propriety and wisdom of appointing agency
lawyers to conduct grand jury proceedings were again challenged,
but without success.
This pattern of accusation and denial suggests that agencies
may indeed view the grand jury as a potential tool for gathering
information with important civil uses. Rule 6(e) has made clear,
though, that an agency's subsequent, derivative use of grand jury
evidence without judicial consent is unlawful.39 The law has not
made clear enough, however, that the direction and control of the
grand jury during the proceedings must remain firmly with the
United States attorney, or else a new kind of grand jury abuse may
develop. The problem arises when a grand jury is legitimately con-
vened but an agency lawyer serving as special attorney is able to
divert or broaden its inquiry to elicit information relevant to civil
or regulatory matters which that lawyer directs back at the agency.
The interposition of a neutral magistrate at the appointment stage
is needed in order to screen agency lawyers' access to the grand
jury proceeding and thereby prevent the United States attorney
from becoming a tool of the agency.40
II. EvOLUTION OF THE CASE LAW
A. The "Appearance of Impropriety"
The first case to discuss agency involvement with grand juries
was General Motors,41 in which the Justice Department, evidently
upon the recommendation of an IRS lawyer, authorized a special
grand jury to investigate possible criminal tax violations by General
Motors. 42  After the district court refused to disqualify the IRS
administrative process cannot develop the relevant facts within a reasonable period
of time . . .." [1979 5 INTERNAL REVENuE MANUAL (CCII) pt. 9267.2(1)(a).
86470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
37589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978).
38 No. 78-1940 (3d Cir. June 25, 1979).
39 FED. R. Cmim. P. 6(e)(2)(C)(i).
4OHearings, supra note 3, at 152 (testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum).
41573 F.2d 936, rev'd en bane, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 1277 (1979).
42 573 F.2d at 938.
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lawyer, Judge Weick writing for the court of appeals, reversed.
Although the judge found that "[n]othing precluding such an ap-
pointment is found in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure"43
and that agency lawyers were "attorneys for the government" for
purposes of rule 6(d), he held instead that the lawyer should be
disqualified for violating canon 9 of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, which states, "A lawyer should avoid even the appear-
ance of professional impropriety." -4 A conflict existed, said the
judge, because the agency attorney's interest naturally lies in justi-
fying the agency's recommendation that the case be referred for
criminal investigation. Indeed, the IRS lawyer had disclosed a
clear intention to utilize grand jury materials to that end,45 thereby
creating the apperance of a conflict of interest. This apperance,
said Judge Weick, limited the power of the Attorney General to
appoint special assistants.
46
On rehearing the case en banc, the Sixth Circuit reversed on
procedural grounds.47 Dissenting, Judge Weick presciently noted
that "[ilt appears that the appointment of an agency attorney as a
Special Attorney to conduct a grand jury investigation in a matter
which the agency attorney has instigated, and in which he had been
previously involved, is not an isolated incident." 48 He contended
this time that the agency lawyer's involvement compromised the
prosecutor's impartiality 9 creating a conflict of interest that vi-
olated the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial.
43 Id.
44 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmrry Canon No. 9.
45573 F.2d at 942.
46 Id. 943.
47 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
48Id. 1381-82. This was practically admitted by government counsel, who
defended the propriety of such a practice in an exchange with the district judge.
Judge Weick recorded the transcript in his opinion, 584 F.2d at 1374:
The COURT: Why can't you take any Internal Revenue Service lawyer
and make him a special attorney by appointment and turn the grand jury
investigation over to him, let him run the whole show?
[Government Counsel]: Conceivably that could be done.
The COURT: You are saying that would be appropriate?
[Government Counsel]: Yes, your honor ....
Judge Weick supported his position by citing two cases, United States v. Braniff
Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex. 1977), and United States v. Gold,
470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. IlI. 1979). Indeed, Judge Weick noted that "[t]his is
one of the most important cases ever to be presented to an appellate court for
review." 584 F.2d at 1373.
49 Id. 1382-84.
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Objections based on the "inherent conflict of interest" or "ap-
pearance of impropriety" have been raised repeatedly in post-
General Motors challenges to the presence of agency attorneys in
grand jury proceedings. With the exception of United States v.
Gold,5° however, other courts have rejected this line of argument,
citing with approval Judge Orrick's observation in United States v.
Dondich, that "to the extent that [the SEC attorney] did have an
interest in seeing the [criminal] investigation produce a successful
prosecution, it is unclear in what way he differs from any other
zealous prosecutor." 51
Even if Judge Weick's theories of impropriety and unconstitu-
tionality are unconvincing, there remain the statutory problems
raised when an agency attorney assumes a prosecutorial role inside
the grand jury room. What Judge Weick so summarily accepted-
that the Attorney General has the power to bring agency lawyers
within the definition of "attorneys for the government" for pur-
poses of rule 6(d), thereby permitting them inside the grand jury
room-has been the subject of more discussion in other courts.
The central thesis developed in these subsequent decisions is
that such power was granted by the 1906 statute authorizing the
appointment of special attorneys,52 and that the new protections of
rule 6(e) were adequate to "sanitize" 11 the presence of agency
attorneys at the grand jury proceedings.
B. Construing Rules 6(d) and 6(e)
The first indication that rule 6(e) would be construed to in-
sulate from judicial scrutiny all forms of agency participation in
grand jury investigations came in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,
April, 1978, at Baltimore 54 (decided before the final General Motors
decision) which set forth a mere "good faith" standard. The grand
jury investigation at issue began after the defendant successfully
resisted an IRS summons. Judge Winter noted that "several agents
previously involved in the administrative investigation [were]
deputized for the grand jury probe. The subpoenas then served
by the grand jury sought the same materials which the IRS had
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain administratively." 55 The de-
50470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. IMI. 1979). See text accompanying notes 157-58
& 170-74 infra.
51460 F. Supp. 849, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
5228 U.S.C. § 515(a) (1976). See text accompanying note 15 supra.
53 In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260, 267 (7th Cir. 1978).
54 581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1533 (1979).
55 Id. 1107-8.
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fendant, therefore, claimed the grand jury was used "as a subterfuge
for gaining access to documents IRS need[ed] in its pending civil
and criminal investigation of [the defendant]." r1 The issue in the
case, therefore, became motive. The district court relied on an
affidavit by an IRS special agent "explaining the decision to initiate
a grand jury investigation by pointing to the imminence of the
bar of limitation." 57 The court of appeals agreed that it was
sufficient, during the course of the grand jury's proceedings, "to
rely on the government's own affirmations of good faith," 5 espe-
cially since defendant's interests were fully protected by the pro-
visions of rule 6(e). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the 1977
amendments expressly permitted disclosure to agency personnel for
the purpose of assisting the United States attorney,59 as well as
subsequent disclosure to federal agencies if the grand jury materials
were released by a judge.60 The former is controlled by the threat
of contempt for unauthorized use while the latter requires a court
order predicated upon a demonstration of good faith.61 The court
concluded "Any abuse of the grand jury process can be dealt with
effectively at another time and in another manner." 62
It is unclear whether the IRS assistants in this case actually
appeared before the grand jury. The first case to hold expressly
that agency attorneys could participate in the proceeding itself was
In re Perlin,0 3 which upheld the practice on both ethical and statu-
tory grounds. In that case an attorney for the Commodities Fu-
tures Trading Commission (CFTC), Koblenz, who had worked on
agency investigations of the "soybean pit" of the Chicago Board
of Trade, referred materials relating to criminal violations to the
United States attorney's office in Chicago. Shortly thereafter, be-
cause the CFTC and the Justice Department "were conducting
parallel investigations," 11 Koblenz was appointed special assistant
United States attorney. When the United States attorney began an
investigation of trading in the silver pit, Koblenz gave reports of
the grand jury's findings to the Justice Department, to his immedi-




59 FED. R. Cawm. P. 6(e)(2)(A)(ii).
"Old. 6(e)(2)(C)(i).
61581 F.2d at 1110.
62 d.
03589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978).
B4 Id. 262.
.1979]
170 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
sion of Enforcement. Perlin, the appellant, was called before the
grand jury to answer questions about his trading in silver, but he
was evidently also asked about soybean trading, in which there was
an ongoing administrative proceeding. 5 Despite a grant of im-
munity, Perlin refused to testify. Acting upon claims that the
grand jury was tainted by the presence of Koblenz and the large
number of disclosees in the CFTC, the trial judge held an evi-
dentiary hearing into possible abuse of the grand jury and ruled
that there was "no evidence that the receipt of [information] was
used to in any manner assist in the civil litigation ..... 6
In a per curiam decision, the Seventh Circuit upheld Koblenz's
participation in the grand jury proceeding as proper.67 In consider-
ing the effect of rule 6, the court said that "[t]here is no question
that a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney is an 'Attorney for the gov-
ernment' "; 68 it follows that agency participation in the grand jury
was validated by rule 6(e) (2)(A)(i), allowing "disclosure . . . [to]
be made to an attorney for the government for use in the perform-
ance of such attorney's duty." 69 That subsection, however, merely
"validates" disclosure of grand jury materials; it was not intended
to open the door to all forms of "agency participation," and legisla-
tive history 70 nowhere suggests that the 1977 amendments modify-
ing rule 6(e) were meant to affect other safeguards contained in
other sections of the rule.
Thus, actual presence in the grand jury proceedings continues
to be regulated by rule 6(d),71 yet neither the parties nor the court
in Perlin seemed to notice that section's relevance to the issue of
Koblenz's appearance before the grand jury. Without distinguishing
between disclosure of records and access to proceedings, the court
mistakenly used rule 6(e) as the test for grand jury presence:
[Perlin] complains first that Koblenz is an improper person
in the grand jury room, whose presence required the grand
65Id. 262-63. Although it is true that the United States attorney, not
Koblenz, asked the questions on soybean trading, the basic problem of abuse may
still be present. The agency lawyer may have prompted the questions; further, he
was present and in a position to ask follow-up questions.
66 Id. 263.
67 For a discussion of the first ground relied on by the court, the appointment
power of the Attorney General under 28 U.S.C. § 515(a), see text accompanying
notes 98-103 infra.
68 589 F.2d at 266. In fact, this premise is not self-evident and deserves
closer examination. See text accompanying notes 123-41 infra.
69 FED. R. CRim. P. 6(e)(2)(A)(i).
7 0 See text accompanying notes 98-122 infra.
71 For the text of rule 6(d), see note 18 supra.
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jury's dissolution, because he brought no special skills to
the investigation, and is thus not a proper. "disclosee"
under Rule 6(e). To the extent that prior cases required
a showing of "particularized need" for disclosure to agency
personnel, they have been superseded by the amendments
to Rule 6(e). 72
Ignoring the underlying caution and limited scope of the 1977
amendments and viewing rule 6(e)'s threat of contempt for unau-
thorized disclosure as a "sufficient safeguard," 73 the court con-
cluded that "[r]ule 6(e) sanitizes the appearance of an agency
attorney before the grand jury, once his is appointed a Special
Assistant U.S. Attorney." 74 As will be shown later, the legislative
history in fact provides no basis for this conclusion.75
The court acknowledged that disclosure to Koblenz and,
through him, to his superiors in the CFTC Division of Enforce-
ment, increased the risk of leakage into ongoing civil investigations,
but it found no indication that such leaks had actually occurred; it
thus felt that a per se rule against use of agency attorneys to conduct
grand juries would be "an act of needless caution." 76
The thesis that the protections of rule 6(e) are adequate to
"sanitize" the presence of agency attorneys at grand jury proceed-
ings produced similar results in the Ninth Circuit, in United States
v. Dondich,77 and in the Third Circuit, in United States v. Bird-
man s the facts of which parallel Perlin very closely.79  Dondich
illustrates the imprecision with which courts have used the legisla-
tive history of the 1977 amendments. Relying on the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee Report, 0 Judge Orrick concluded, "These pas-
sages signal that both the Congress and the Supreme Court support
active participation by agency attorneys in grand jury investiga-
72589 F.2d at 266.
78 Id. 268.
74 Id. 267.
75 See text accompanying notes 108-22 infra.
76 589 F.2d at 268.
77460 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
78 No. 78-1940 (3d Cir. June 25, 1979).
79 In Birdman a senior staff attorney for the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion referred an investigation to the Justice Department, which in turn designated
him its special attorney authorized to conduct the grand jury proceedings. He
remained on the SEC's payroll and continued to act as an SEC attorney in related
administrative matters. Id., slip op. at 3.
80 S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. CoDE.
CoNG. & Am. NEws 527, 531.
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tions." "I The unstated and erroneous premise is that Congress's ex-
pressed interest in interagency cooperation affected rule 6(d).82 Judge
Orrick did concede that if the IRS indeed sought to use "the grand
jury proceeding as a short cut to goals otherwise barred or more
difficult to reach," then it might be appropriate to halt a civil pro-
ceeding which had improperly benefited from the grand jury in-
vestigation. 3 He expressly refused, however, to say that such abuse
would be grounds for disqualification of the agency attorney.
8 4
In only one recent case, United States v. Gold,85 has a court
found an agency attorney's presence in the grand jury room to be
unauthorized. Although the court reached a proper result, its ad
hoc treatment fails to grapple with the statutory arguments for and
against such a practice, perhaps because Judge Leighton felt bound
by his circuit's disposition of the statutory issues in Perlin. The
result is an opinion which exhaustively chronicles the facts and
devotes comparatively little discussion to the law.80
Gold held that an Environmental Protection Agency attorney,
simultaneously conducting a grand jury investigation as a special
attorney and participating in a parallel administrative proceeding
involving the same defendant, labored under a conflict of interest
which made him an unauthorized person in the grand jury room.
This conclusion amounts to a judge-made gloss on rule 6(d), and,
indeed, no direct citation to that section appears in this part of the
court's opinion.8 7 Gold does, however, signal that the Perlin line
of cases rejecting a per se rule does not preclude objectors from
successfully showing extreme agency abuse at a full evidentiary
hearing.
88
81460 F. Supp. at 856.
82 See text accompanying notes 98-122 infra.
83 Id. 858.
84 Id.
85470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. MI1. 1979).
86 For a more thorough discussion of Gold, see text accompanying notes 157-58
& 170-74 infra.
8 7 Rule 6(d) is relied on in another section of the opinion that criticizes the
EPA attorney for appearing as a witness at the same time as he was serving as
prosecutor. The court was able to rely on cases holding rule 6(d) prohibits a
witness from remaining in the grand jury room after his testimony and was, there-
fore, breached when the attorney stayed on as a prosecutor. 470 F. Supp. at
1351-52.
88Id. 1346. An interesting sidelight to Gold is that the record in that
case suggests a change in the views of Judge Parsons, whose district court decision
to permit an agency attorney into the grand jury was upheld in Perlin. Whereas
Judge Parsons held an evidentiary hearing into the allegations of abuse in that
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C. The Danger of Prospective Abuse
In refusing to announce a per se rule against agency attorneys
conducting grand jury investigations, the courts in Perlin, Dondich,
and Birdman were perhaps toppling a straw man. This Comment
does not advocate such a stringent precaution because complex
cases may arise that actually require agency expertise in the conduct
of proceedings, and carefully drafted rules, like those proposed in
this Comment, 9 can prevent serious abuses. The fact remains,
however, that courts which have addressed the issue so far have
remained indifferent or unaware of the new, special risks posed
when agency attorneys serve a prosecutorial role as appointed spe-
cial attorneys. That practice creates not only the risk of disclosure
of evidence developed by the grand jury but also the risk of an
agency actively developing the grand jury evidence.
This distinction may be illustrated by reference to PerlinY0
In that case Special Attorney Koblenz was careful not to allow
other CFTC employees access to his materials. Following pro-
cedures suggested by earlier court decisions, 91 he placed grand jury
materials in a safe and had the investigative staff sworn to secrecy
as agents of the grand jury.92  The leakage which rule 6(e) is de-
signed to prevent was controlled under such circumstances. None
case and found none, 589 F.2d at 263, he did not think it looked proper for the
EPA attorney in the Gold litigation to request permission to disclose documents to
his agency while he was serving as a special assistant in the grand jury investigation.
Judge Parsons's reaction during the hearing on this request is quoted by Judge
Leighton in his Findings of Fact in Gold:
It doesn't look good, even if nothing happened that was untoward, I
think that it looks wrong, it just looks wrong. It has the imprint of im-
propriety for a matter to come here to be presented to the Grand Jury of
the Northern District of Illinois about an environmental problem concern-
ing which there is an administrative agency which is not a part of the
judicial, administrative agency that is a part of the executive branch of the
government, carrying on its own investigation and proceedings before a
hearing body, a hearing officer, and then to have the United States Attor-
ney for the Northern District of Illinois come in and have join with
*him the attorney for the administrative agency [Mr. Kennedy] as co-
attorney to present the matter to the grand jury, aware of the fact that
that would involve disclosures or the possibility of disclosures in advance
of court orders [or] disclosures that would have to be assumed under the
first provision of Rule 6(e), and I think that it just doesn't look good.
Findings of Fact at 69 (No. 77-CR-1073) (unpublished).
89 See text accompanying notes 153-74 infra.
90589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978).
91 See, e.g., Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F.
Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
92589 F.2d at 262.
19791
174 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of these precautions, however, limited Koblenz's own ability to lead
the grand jury into other areas in which the CFTC might have
interests, or to use whatever new knowledge he gained in subse-
quent CFTC work. This potential for prospective manipulation
of grand jury materials afforded by the appointment of an agency
attorney to conduct a grand jury is the crux of the problem. Un-
fettered by any rules of relevance or materiality, agency lawyers can
engage in extremely broad inquiries, for they will be searching for
information of potential future use as well as information relevant
to the present investigation. 93 For example, an EPA lawyer investi-
gating the likely origin of pollutants may now be able to ask far-
ranging questions of industry representatives under the pretext of
investigating the alleged pollution. Similarly, an SEC lawyer, aid-
ing the United States attorney's investigation of foreign bribes will
be privy to information about a corporation which might sub-
sequently be under his regulatory authority.
This magnified investigatory power can be enjoyed inadvert-
ently as well as plotted in advance. A grand jury witness who is
unaware that he is speaking to an agency lawyer whose ordinary
duties are regulation of the witness's industry is likely to disclose
information that he might otherwise keep to himself. When the
agency lawyer returns to his usual work and acts on that accidentally
gained knowledge, the processes of the grand jury have been
abused.94
93 To be sure, such prospective abuse has yet to surface with any frequency in
the courts. Still, it is a very real problem: considering the occasional insensitivity
of agency lawyers to the distinction between agency and grand jury investigations,
see, e.g., text accompanying notes 170-74 infra, it is not difficult to envision future
civil or administrative proceedings in which the defendant objects that evidence
used against him was obtained by an agency lawyer conducting a "fishing ex-
pedition" as a special assistant to a grand jury investigation.
94 One member of the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, who foresaw
risks even in amending rule 6(e) to allow disclosure to experts, posed the problem
vividly in a discussion with Judge Robb during the 1977 hearings on rule 6(e):
Mr. HYDE: ... Once this IRS fellow has sat there and learned that
the president of the ABC Co. is not reporting all of the income, he then
tiptoes back to the IRS and how does he expunge that from his mind? ...
Judge ROBB: . . . [Ylou would treat [that] just as though it was in-
formation received through an unlawful wiretap or an invalid search and
seizure.
Mr. HYDE: I appreciate that if the source of the information is ever
known. It could be done inadvertently. It could be not necessarily
malicious or anything. An IRS agent is an IRS agent.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 87.
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Once the relevant evidence has been developed or stumbled
upon, agency lawyers can-if they bother to-petition a judge to
release it for use in a subsequent or concurrent civil proceeding
pursuant to rule 6(e) (2)(C)(i). If need for the "release" were
shown,9 the onus would then be upon the defendant to show that
the agency lawyer's first involvement in the grand jury proceeding
was motivated by a bad faith desire to develop the evidence subse-
quently applied for by the agency.9 6 More realistically, the agent
might never petition for release of the grand jury materials be-
cause he already knows their contents. Several experts testifying
during the hearings on the 1977 amendments agreed that agency
personnel could "go back and work on a civil case without getting
the grand jury transcripts . . . and have all the benefit of that
information which should have been secret before the grand jury." 97
Although this prospective abuse ought to be punishable by
contempt, there is no guarantee that it will or ever could be. The
agency lawyer's broadened knowledge of the defendant might never
be disclosed to anyone else within the agency, so, strictly speaking,
the lawyer will have maintained the secrecy of the grand jury. Al-
though subparagraph (2)(B) of rule 6(e) prohibits agency personnel
enlisted as technical assistants under subparagraph (2)(A)(ii) from
outside use of evidence developed by the grand jury, the rule does
not make clear that this same stricture applies to agency lawyers
appointed as special attorneys. Even if it does, a defendant alleging
that evidence used against him in a civil proceeding was derived by a
special attorney from a grand jury investigation might face a dif-
ficult problem of proof. It would be difficult to establish whether
suspicions leading to investigation were prompted by the agency
lawyer's experience in the grand jury or by independent investiga-
tive efforts. As long as courts continue to make the error of using
the new rule 6(e) to legitimize the presence of agency attorneys
in the grand jury room, without attention to limitations contained
in rule 6(d), this expanded potential for prospective abuse of the
grand jury will go unchecked.
95 For a discussion of the "particularized need" requirement and its current
vitality, see Note, supra note 5, at 321-25.
96 See In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464, 477 (E.D. Pa.
1971); United States v. Pennsalt Chem. Corp., 260 F. Supp. 171, 174-80 (E.D. Pa.
1966); Note, supra note 5, at 311; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at
1314.
97 Hearings, supra note 3, at 24 (testimony of Terry Philip Segal); see also id.
153 (testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum).
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III. ASSISTANCE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE
GRAND JURY ROOM COMPARED
At first glance, it might seem that the dangers of prospective
abuse and the difficulties of enforcement are equally present when
agency agents and experts merely gain access to grand jury materials
by providing technical assistance outside the grand jury room. If
so, allowing agency attorneys to conduct the proceeding itself as a
special attorney would not be significantly different. Several factors,
however, caution against making such assumptions.
A. The Effects of High Status
For example, the potential for abuse may seem greater when
agency attorneys are allowed, in effect, to "prosecute" because such
attorneys likely occupy higher positions of authority within the
agency than the routine investigative agents, accountants, and hand-
writing experts whom the framers of the new rule 6(e) had in
mind.98 Higher positions imply correspondingly more independ-
ence and power to use information developed by the grand jury
for a variety of regulatory and policymaking purposes without
necessarily having to disclose the source of such information or
justify one's suspicions. To the extent that agency attorneys now
being permitted to participate in the grand jury process can return
to their agencies and direct on their own initiative that files be
opened, investigations commenced, settlements negotiated, or policy
formulated vis-4-vis a particular company or industry, grand jury
materials can be used in a variety of subtle ways, consciously or
unconsciously, without the need actually to disclose such informa-
tion to superiors in clear violation of rule 6(e)(1).
During consideration of the 1977 amendments, such silent
abuses were feared in the context of the IRS,99 probably in part
because the same IRS agents who might give technical assistance
also had this capacity to initiate investigations and manage a case-
load. The circumstances of United States v. Gold 100 suggest, how-
ever, that the participation of agency attorneys in grand juries prom-
ises to involve other federal agencies as well. The attorney in Gold
retained his position at EPA and, while helping to conduct a grand
jury inquiry into Velsicol Corporation, simultaneously represented
EPA publicly on related matters. For example, he represented
EPA at a meeting concerning a contract related to an administra-
9 8 See, e.g., id. 29, 37 (testimony of Hon. Edward R. Becker); id. 86, 89
(testimony of Prof. Wayne LaFave).
99 See note 97 supra & accompanying text.
100470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
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tive proceeding against Velsicol and concerning the same pesticides
at issue before the grand jury. He also represented the agency
at a meeting with representatives of the National Agricultural
Chemicals Association, at which was discussed the meaning of the
EPA regulation involved in the grand jury case.101 Indeed, the
lawyer's advancement at EPA "depended on the commendation and
approval he received from his superiors at EPA, to whom he was
under orders to report at least once each week." 102 Thus, the
lawyer's activities in Gold may contain a larger policymaking com-
ponent, involve more public exposure, and present more tempta-
tions for an ambitious young staff attorney to capitalize on grand
jury evidence than would the activities of a lower-level, and per-
haps more obedient, investigator or documents analyst of the type
Congress may have thought it was dealing with when it amended
rule 6(e).10
3
B. The Distinction Between Inside and Outside
Leaving aside distinctions made in terms of status and sub-
sequent use, others have argued that agency assistants working out-
side the grand jury have almost as much opportunity to manipulate
the grand jury questioning as do those actually conducting the pro-
ceeding.1°4 According to this view, any additional potential for
abuse posed by having agency attorneys appear before the grand
jury is "slight," because the assistant outside the room merely has
to suggest and frame questions for the prosecuting attorney to ask
to probe areas that might produce important civil results.
Although the outside assistant may in theory be in a position
to influence the questioning, in practice a United States attorney
101 2d. 1342.
102 Id. 1348.
103 See note 98 supra. The court in Perlin found "no requirement that the
assistance offered by a Rule 6(e) 'disclosee' or a special assistant U.S. attorney
must be technical in nature." 589 F.2d at 268. Although such a construction is
possible on the face of the statute, the legislative history is sufficiently ambiguous
and the implications sufficiently critical that, in this Comment's view, Congress
should specify the range of agency personnel available to grand jury investigations
and not leave such an issue entirely to the construction of the courts. The mere
construction of rule 6(d) as excluding agency attorneys from presence in the grand
jury proceedings would not necessarily resolve the problem because such attorneys
could still be enlisted as assistants under rule 6(e)(2)(A)(ii), free to examine all
grand jury records and transcripts outside the room. More important, given the
Justice Department's need for them in some cases, the total exclusion of agency
attorneys is neither feasible nor desirable. See text accompanying notes 142-43
infra. More stringent procedural safeguards tailored to the expanded risks posed
by having agency attorneys conduct grand juries are needed.
104 Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1315-16 n.29.
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is more apt to detect and resist a significant diversion 105 if he re-
mains responsible for conducting the questioning. Such diver-
sionary probing would consume much of the United States at-
torney's time and effort; moreover, because he may also be less able
to follow up on responses effectively, he may require frequent
outside consultation with the agency assistant, taking up even more
time. If, on the other hand, the practice of agency attorneys con-
ducting grand juries without restriction gains acceptance, such at-
torneys may increasingly direct them without supervision,0 6 and so
be free to manipulate the questioning at will.
It is significant that several witnesses and congressmen parti-
cipating in the legislative hearings on the 1977 amendments to rule
6(e) saw a distinct difference between agency assistance outside the
grand jury room and agency presence inside the proceedings.107
These spokesmen fully expected rule 6(d) to continue in force as a
deliberate check on access of agency personnel to the grand jury
room.
C. Legislative History
Indeed, the legislative history of those amendments, so heavily
relied on by the courts, further cautions against blurring the dis-
tinction between agency access to materials and to the proceedings
themselves. Neither the hearings held by the House Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, s08 its report,10 9 nor the report of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary,"0 which produced the final version of
the amendments, said anything about agency attorneys. Instead,
they indicate that the drafters were extremely sensitive to the risks
of any agency participation and meant to carve out a limited ex-
ception to the rule of grand jury secrecy. The version of rule 6(e)
ultimately enacted was purposefully more detailed than the one
originally submitted by the Supreme Court,"' which the legislators
did not believe contained a clear enough prohibition against misuse
105 Id. 1320.
106 See, e.g., United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1342 (N.D. M11. 1979),
in which the court indicates that an EPA attorney sometimes examined the witness
alone and at other times assisted his coprosecutor from the Justice Department.
107 See text accompanying notes 113-19 infra.
1
0 
See note 3 supra.
109 H.R. REP. No. 95-195, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
110 S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 527.
1i1 See note 6 supra.
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and breach of secrecy.1 2  Under such circumstances, it seems more
appropriate to construe rule 6(e) strictly than to let expansive inter-
pretation erode the safeguards already contained in rule 6(d).
Especially significant in this regard are Representative Holtz-
man's remarks aimed at clarifying the point that the proposed
amendments were not intended to facilitate agency access to the
grand jury room itself. In a question to Judge Becker, whose
landmark opinions on agency assistance113 -were heavily relied on by
the drafters, Representative Holtzman asked whether there might
be an "unintentional corollary" to the amendment that would allow
agency personnel to sit in on the grand jury proceedings. Judge
Becker replied that rule 6(e) as amended did not accomplish this
undesirable result and agreed that the point should be clarified. 14
He pointed out that the amended rule 6(e) was intended to allow
government personnel to assist the United States attorney outside
the grand jury room only."15 Noting that the amendment emanated
112 S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 527, 532.
"3 Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098
(E.D. Pa. 1976); In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
2"4 The exchange was as follows:
Ms. Holtzman: Let me ask you a question that counsel has brought
to my attention. It is possible that there may be an unintentional
corollary to the proposed amendment. By changing the definition of
"attorney for the Government," it may now be possible for IRS agents
or SEC agents to sit in when the grand jury hears a witness.
Is that something that is desirable?
Judge Becker: That is certainly not desirable. I don't think that the
amendment accomplishes that. The amendment says "disclosure of matters
occurring before the grand jury." It talks about to whom disclosure may
be made. I don't have the rules here.
I think there is another subdivision of rule 6 which says who can be
in the grand jury.
Ms. Holtzman: That is right. Subsection d of rule 6 says who may
be present It says attorneys for the Government, the witness under
examination, and so forth may be present while the grand jury is in session.
Judge Becker: I think that ought to be clarified.
Ms. Holtzman: It would be your opinion that it would be unde-
sirable to have IRS agents, handwriting experts, SEC personnel and the
like in the grand jury room.
Judge Becker: I think they should not be permitted in the grand
jury room.
Ms. Holtzman: And that ought to be clarified.
Judge Becker: I think it should.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 39-40 (testimony of Hon. Edward R. Becker).
"5 Id. 40-41.
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from his decision in In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc.,n6 a
case solely concerning help outside the grand jury room, he said
that presence in the grand jury room is governed by rule 6(d).
I think that by virtue of the juxtaposition of (e) and [(d)]
... that it should be made crystal clear that these people
cannot be inside the grand jury room.
... [T]he purpose of the amendment is to permit anal-
ysis and evaluation of material which is subpenaed [sic] to
the grand jury, and that is outside the grand jury room."
7
Wayne R. LaFave, reporter to the Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules, which had drafted the original Supreme Court
proposals, added that the amendment could not change the restricted
category of the people who may be present in the grand jury room:
That was not the intention and I don't believe that would
be a fair interpretation of the added language because it
[the Advisory Committee's version of the amendment 118]
says for the purpose of this subdivision, which is subdivi-
sion (e) only.
I don't think there is anything in the new language
that in any way could be read as enlarging the group of
people who may be physically present in the grand jury
room.
1 19
In neither of these dialogues was consideration given to the
wisdom or propriety of an agency attorney being specially appointed
to conduct a grand jury; instead, the speakers were objecting to the
possibility of IRS agents or SEC investigators being permitted to
sit in on grand jury proceedings. Although it does not
evitably follow, it seems conceivable that these spokesmen would
have objected even more strenuously to the possibility of the agency
attorney actually conducting the proceeding. Indeed, neither the
House nor Senate committees had an opportunity to comment on
the decisions, beginning with General Motors, that debated the
propriety of that practice, because the Sixth Circuit's initial opinion
in that case had not yet been handed down.
116 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
17 Hearings, supra note 3, at 41 (testimony of Hon. Edward R. Becker).
118 See note 6 supra.
119 Id. 90 (testimony of Wayne R. LaFave). Representative Holtzman replied,
"I am glad to get assurance on the record that that was not the intention." Id.
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The Senate draftsmen worked closely 120 with the House sub-
committee members in revising the proposal and fashioning rule
6(e) as it was ultimately enacted. In light of this collaboration,
the express disapproval in the House hearings 121 of the presence
of agency personnel in the grand jury room strongly suggests that
rule 6(e)'s amendment was not intended to affect rule 6(d) nor
facilitate the presence of agency lawyers.
1 22
IV. THE APPOINTMENT POWER UNDER SECTION 515(a)
Establishing that the amendments to rule 6(e) were not in-
tended to affect rule 6(d) does not solve the problem of who may
statutorily be present in the grand jury room. There remains the
need to reconcile, on the one hand, 28 U.S.C. § 515(a),'123 enacted
in 1906 and permitting appointment of special assistants to conduct
grand juries, with, on the other hand, the policy of grand jury
secrecy codified in rule 6(d), sharply restricting who can attend
grand jury proceedings. Neither provision addresses agency lawyers
expressly. If agency attorneys can be appointed under section
515(a) to conduct grand juries, then questioning their presence in
the grand jury room might seem pointless. Even the court in
Perlin conceded, however, that despite that section's broad lan-
guage, there were "limitations on that power unexpressed in the
120 123 CONG. REC. H7866-67 (daily ed. July 27, 1977) (remarks of Rep.
Mann).
121 See text accompanying notes 113-19 supra.
122 Given the alarm with which the proposal merely to use agency personnel
outside the grand jury room was viewed by corporate and civil liberties lawyers
alike, see, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 23 (testimony of Terry Philip Segal);
id. 152 (testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum); id. 181 (statement of Phylis
Bamberger); id. 194 (testimony of Prof. Leon Friedman), Congress surely
had good reason to doubt the advisability of opening grand jury rooms to
agency personnel. Indeed, the most recent case to involve an agency
attorney presiding over a grand jury, United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1366
(N.D. IIl. 1979), suggests that agency sensitivity to grand jury secrecy has not
improved in response to the rule 6(e) amendments. For a more detailed discussion
of Gold and its implications, see notes 157-58 & 170-74 infra & accompanying text.
It is important to note that the case involved neither the IRS nor the SEC, two
agencies with which Congress seemed particularly concerned. See text following
note 119 supra. The case thus demonstrates that, although Congress may have
focused on admitting IRS and SEC investigators to grand juries, it in fact gave
access to all agencies.
123 The statute reads:
a) The Attorney General or any other officer of the Department of
Justice, or any attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under
law, may, when specifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any
kind of legal proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceed-
ings and proceedings before committing magistrates, which United States
attorneys are authorized by law to conduct, whether or not he is a
resident of the district in which the proceeding is brought.
28 U.S.C. §515(a) (1976).
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statute." 124 That court should have seen the policy of grand jury
secrecy as one such limitation.
A. The Perlin View
Rule 6(d) allows "attorneys for the government" to be present
at the grand jury, and rule 54(c) defines that phrase as the "At-
torney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a
United States Attorney, [and] an authorized assistant of a United
States Attorney." 125 Several courts have held in the past that this
category of "attorneys for the government" does not include agency
lawyers. 126  "The term 'attorneys for the government' is restrictive
in its application .... If it had been intended that the attorneys
for administrative agencies were to have free access to matters oc-
curring before a grand jury, the rule would have so provided." 127
However, these cases did not deal directly with agency attorneys
appointed specially under 28 U.S.C. § 515(a). The court in Per-
lin thus held that an agency lawyer appointed a special attorney
was an "attorney for the government" for purposes of rule 6.128
The court did not mention rule 54(c), but apparently concluded
that such special attorneys fit the description of "authorized as-
sistants of a United States Attorney." The problem with such a
construction is that neither the plain meaning of the words nor
the 1906 legislative history suggests that section 515(a) should enable
all federal agencies to gain entrance to grand jury proceedings,
thereby overriding the deliberate limitations on agencies' investiga-
tive powers which Congress has spelled out elsewhere. 129 An ex-
amination of this legislative history is thus necessary to refute the
Perlin view.
B. Special Assistants: Legislative History
By at least 1903 it had become the practice of the Attorney
General to employ special counsel to assist district attorneys.130
In 1903, however, the Circuit Court of the Southern District of
124 589 F.2d 260, 266 (7th Cir. 1978).
125 FED. R. Cmi. P. 6(d) & 54(c).
12 6 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v.
Daneals, 370 F. Supp. 1289 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
1271n re Grand jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1962).
128 589 F.2d at 266.
129 See Note, supra note 36A, at 178-79.
13 0 H.R. lEP. No. 2901, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1906).
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New York held in United States v. Rosentha1M that the existing
statutes did not permit this practice. In that case a special assistant
was appointed and hired (for uncertain compensation) to conduct
an investigation of alleged fraudulent importation of Japanese silks
at the port of New York.13 2 The assistant apparently had never be-
fore been employed by the federal government in a capacity at all
analogous to agency lawyers; rather, he was simply acquainted with
the facts of the particular case. 33
Congress adopted 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) in response to the Rosen-
thal decision. 3 4 The Attorney General was granted the power to
appoint special counsel "who is specially or particularly qualified
by reason of his peculiar knowledge and skill to properly present
to the grand jury the questions being considered by it." 135 The
committee rebutted the only argument against permitting this power
that it considered. "[I]t is no argument against it that some grand
jury may be, perhaps, unduly influenced by the demands or im-
portunities that may be made upon it by such special counsel. The
same argument can as well be made against permitting a district
attorney from attending a sitting of such jury." 136
The legislative history simply does not address the particular
problem considered by this Comment. Although the Attorney
General may appoint special counsel with special skills, this statute
was drafted to overturn a case that forbade the appointment of a
private attorney and seemed to hold that no such appointments
were permissible. The statute does not address, nor did its drafters
ever consider, the special problems posed by allowing the appoint-
ment of agency lawyers as special assistants.
Judges have generally interpreted section 515(a) broadly in
the government's favor, and it now seems established, after In re
Persico,37 that the Attorney General can appoint anyone in the
Justice Department as a special attorney to assist local district at-
torneys. 38 No cases under section 515(a), however, had ever di-
'3' 121 F. 862 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903).
132 Id. 863.
'33 The assistant was evidently approached for advice by the Merchant's Asso-
ciation of the City of New York, the complainants, the month before his appointment.
He was not their general counsel, however. Id. 863-64.
'34 H.R. REP. No. 2901, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1906).
'35 Id. 2.
L36 Id.
'37 322 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1975).
.3 8 See United States v. Morrison, 531 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 837 (1976); United States v. Wrigley, 520 F.2d 362 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 987 (1975).
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rectly'validated the appointment of lawyers from federal agencies
other than the Justice Department for the purpose of conducting
a grand jury until In re Perlin 139 and United States v. Dondich.14
The reliance of those two decisions on Persico and its progeny is in-
apposite since the Justice Department is the one federal agency
clearly intended by Congress to have access to the grand jury process.
To extend unthinkingly such access to other federal agencies on the
basis of section 515(a) is unwarranted both because the 1906 legis-
lation was written long before the huge expansion in agency powers
and because the more recent and complete evidence of congressional
preference-the rule 6(e) hearings and reports-indicates agency
involvement in grand jury investigations is to be strictly con-
trolled.14
1
V. NEw RULES: BEGINNING AGAIN
The better approach is to design new rules that directly ad-
dress the use of agency lawyers to conduct grand juries. Because
this practice entails added potential for abuse, such rules would
impose even more stringent controls than those applied to technical
assistance by rule 6(e). Such a scheme would still permit a United
States attorney to tap an agency's legal talent when its special
expertise was truly necessary to the success of a criminal investiga-
tion. Just as agency technical assistance is often necessary for the de-
ciphering of grand jury materials,142 so a United States attorney
may sometimes be unable to gather or present evidence before a
grand jury without the assistance of an agency lawyer. Very few re-
gional United States attorneys' offices have personnel with the ex-
pertise to conduct a complex investigation of tax, securities, or
environmental law. Some agency attorneys claim that in many cases,
if the agency lawyers don't conduct the investigation, it won't be
conducted at all. 43 The cost to the criminal justice system of totally
excluding this expertise from the grand jury process would thus be
significant.
A. Lessons from Rule 6(e)
Any rules designed to regulate the access of agency lawyers
to the grand jury must be practical and effective unlike the cur-
139 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978).
140 460 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
141 See text accompanying notes 113-19, supra.
142 Hearings, supra note 3, at 70-71 (statement of Acting Deputy Attorney
General Richard L. Thornburgh).
143 Interview with an agency lawyer (notes in possession of the author).
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rent procedure of rule 6(e). As developed by the courts
and Congress, the scheme posits a tight housekeeping system,
1 "
but provides inadequate enforcement procedures and remedies. If
an agency lawyer has manipulated the grand jury process strictly
for civil purposes and afterwards bothers to apply for a rule 6(e)
order permitting subsequent use,145 the application should be de-
nied and the civil investigation perhaps halted, as the court in
Dondich 14 suggested. However, this action is contingent on the
civil defendant's ability to show evidence of the agency's bad
faith to rebut the presumption of regularity of grand jury proceed-
ings, a burden that is difficult to meet.1 47  If granted an adversary
hearing,148 the challenger bears the burden of proof even though
such proof will be entirely in the hands of the agency.149
Even absent bad faith, a great deal of information useful in a
later civil proceeding may be obtained inadvertently by an agency
lawyer from the grand jury investigation. If such information is
routinely disclosed by judges under rule 6(e)(2)(C)(i), without a
showing of "particularized need," 150 then the distinction between
administrative and criminal investigatory powers will be largely
illusory. The scheme of subparagraph (C)(i) contemplating judi-
cial consent for derivative use of grand jury evidence also does not
sufficiently protect against the problem of sub silentio abuse. 15' It
144Rule 6(e)(2)(B) provides in relevant part: "An attorney for the govern-
ment shall promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the
grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to
whom such disclosure has been made." FED. R. Cim. P. 6(e)(2)(B). Further
housekeeping measures were suggested by judge Becker in Robert Hawthorne, Inc.
v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
145 FED. R. CGmn. P. 6(e)(2)(C)(i).
146 460 F. Supp. at 858.
3
4 7 See note 96 supra & accompanying text. One defense lawyer has asked,
"How do you prove bad faith after the fact? How?" Hearings, supra note 3, at
158 (testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum). The author of Note, supra note 5,
describes the protections of the "good faith" rule as "illusory." Id. 311.
148The framers of rule 6(e) did not make it clear that the challenger had
this opportunity at all; instead they indicated that the hearings on requests for
disclosure under subparagraph (2) (C) (i) should be ex parte. S. REP. No. 95-354,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CoNe. & AD. NEWs 527, 532.
149 Hearings, supra note 3, at 158 (testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum); see
note 96 supra. A full discussion of the ambiguities surrounding applicable stand-
ards and opportunities for remedying abuses of rule 6(e) is beyond the scope of
this Comment The problem has been comprehensively treated in Note, supra
note 5, at 325-26, which concludes that the current protections are inadequate and
the burden of proving good faith should rest upon the government. It recommends
that the judicial inquiry go beyond merely looking to see whether good faith pre-
vailed at the time the grand jury was convened.
160 For an indication that this standard was intended by the framers of rule
6(e), but not necessarily followed by the courts, see Note, supra note 5, at 320-25.
151 See text accompanying notes 89-97 supra.
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is unrealistic to assume that an agency lawyer will forget every-
thing he has learned when he returns to his civil investigatory
role. Without having to apply for release of grand jury materials,
he will have formed suspicions and explored possible leads. In a
subsequent civil proceeding or investigation, it will be difficult for
the subject to quash an agency summons or suppress evidence by
showing they resulted from attorney exposure to grand jury
matters.1
2
These shortcomings suggest the difficulty of correcting abuses
after the fact and the advisability of prophylactic measures de-
signed to reduce the opportunities for such abuse in the first place.
In drafting rule 6(e), Congress declined to adopt such a strategy,
but the new practice of agency attorneys conducting grand jury
investigations enlarges the scope of the risk beyond what Congress
contemplated in 1977; thus, consideration of a sterner screening
process for section 515(a) appointments is appropriate.
B. New Rules
Balancing the above considerations yields the following pro-
posed rules based on the presumption that an agency lawyer should
not be allowed into the grand jury room until all the rules are
satisfied.
1. Showing of Need
Before accepting that an agency lawyer is necessary for the
investigation of crime, a district judge should be satisfied that the
United States attorney is unlikely to be effective alone. A judge
should not accept this proposition if it appears that the United
States attorney has little interest in the investigation, nor should
he too easily accept a simple assertion of technical ignorance. Under
rule 6(e) agency personnel are always available to explain the ele-
ments of the investigation to the United States attorney outside the
grand jury room. Therefore, the requirement that the United
States attorney, in the normal course of affairs, be the investigator
need not be onerous. This "showing of need" requirement will in
most cases screen out agency lawyers who are involved primarily
152 The possibility of employing an independent source test was mentioned in
Simplot v. United States Dist. Court, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. g9146, at 86,199, 39
A.F.T.R.2d 77-372 (9th Cir. 1976), amended, 40 A.F.T.R.2d 77-5001 (9th Cir.
1977), withdrawn, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. rl 9511 (9th Cir. 1977). The prophylactic
effect of such a remedy is open to question, especially if, as one defense lawyer
at the congressional hearings testified, judges show impatience with such motions:
"The idea that they will give you a full hearing and that you will be able to prove
what you think happened is extremely unlikely." Hearings, supra note 3, at 158
(testimony of Bernard J. Nussbaum).
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to gather information they could not otherwise obtain. It is pre-
cisely that kind of curiosity which endangers grand jury secrecy. 53
Further, the burden of this requirement on the judge is not un-
realistic: it is less demanding simply to test the need for one or two
special assistants from agencies than to approve the use of all tech-
nical assistants (like handwriting analysts and accountants), a task
of which judges were relieved under amended rule 6(e).
154
The cost of such a rule in terms of criminal enforcement will
depend partly upon the stringency -with which it is applied. If
the Justice Department is reluctant to prosecute cases without using
special assistants from agencies to conduct proceedings before the
grand jury, then the cost may be considerable: each time the United
States attorney fails to convince a judge that the agency lawyer is
needed, the investigation might be abandoned. This prospect is,
however, somewhat speculative. It is unlikely that an agency expert
could not instruct the United States attorney adequately and make
evidence understandable to members of the jury by testifying on
occasion as a sworn witness.
3 5
A component of the showing of need is an investigation of
good faith-that is, making sure the grand jury is convened for the
legitimate purpose of investigating crimes. Such an investigation
appears to have been made in Perlin,5 but it was not made until
well after the special attorney had been appointed. Further, it did
not directly examine the need for the appointment of a special at-
torney.
A corollary of the showing of good faith would be a require-
ment that the Justice Department pay all expenses of the special
153 It must be conceded that the effectiveness of this type of judicial control
over ongoing investigations has been seriously questioned in the past, most notably
in the context of warrants and wiretaps. See, e.g., Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor
Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1, 13; Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The
Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 169 (1969). Therefore, particular care
should be taken to ensure that the court in this instance does not become a mere
"rubber stamp" ratifying the prosecutor's decisions.
154 Such approval has been given by judges. See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v.
Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See also
Hearings, supra note 3, at 30 (testimony of the Hon. Edward R. Becker) ("[I] am
not so sure that you ought to implicate the judges every step of the way of it;
this is a very complex area and potentially a very onerous area."). Of course, given
the huge parade of technical experts who would have to be approved, the fears of
overtaxing the courts were legitimate. These concerns, as has been noted, do not
apply so strongly with respect to special assistants.
155 Rule 6(d) expressly allows witnesses "under examination" to be present
in the grand jury room.
156 589 F.2d 260, 263 (7th Cir. 1978).
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assistant related to his grand jury activities. Thus, the United
States attorney may not be so agreeable to retaining an agency lawyer
whose presence is not really necessary to the grand jury investiga-
tion, and the agency lawyer participating as an assistant may feel
his loyalty to his agency is no longer undivided. Indeed, the prob-
lem of financial arrangements drew attention in United States v.
Gold, 57 in which the assistant remained on his agency's payroll and
had his plane fares paid for by the agency. Highlighting the prob-
lem, the Justice Department defended this arrangement by saying:
"[The agency lawyer's] activities in support of the United States
Attorney have been concerned strictly with the interests of EPA." 158
2. Investigators Only
The danger of allowing a high-level agency lawyer into the
grand jury room is that he will carry away with him information
upon which he can initiate a subsequent civil investigation or per-
haps make regulatory policy. Thus, any agency lawyers "in a posi-
tion to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about
any action which the... [agency] may take upon the advice of the
attorney," 159 should be barred from grand jury participation. By
limiting the agency lawyers eligible to conduct grand juries to those
who will not be able to instigate investigations or direct policy
within the agency, this rule would allow agency personnel to con-
duct the grand jury while ensuring that they would not "tiptoe" 160
back to their agency to begin an investigation of what was said or
suggested by a grand jury witness. Although any agency employee
present at the grand jury hearing could report on the proceedings
to his superiors, such disclosure would clearly violate rule 6(e) and
the third of the proposed rules of this Comment if the reports went
beyond general accounts of how the assistant was employed.' 6'
157470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
158 Id. 1342.
159 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485
(E.D. Pa. 1962). Use of this quotation deliberately borrows from cases which
define the "control group" within a corporation for purposes of assigning attorney-
client privilege. See, e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n., 320 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
160 See note 94 supra & accompanying text.
161 Courts have been excessively lenient in letting grand jury assistants report
to their agency superiors on their activities. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,
April, 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103, 1109 n.14 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 1533 (1979) (IRS agents filed reports with chief of Service's Intern-
gence Division; court held this permissible saying merely that chief was thereby
brought within nondisclosure obligation of rule 6(e)); accorc In re Perlin, 589
F.2d 260, 269 (7th Cir. 1978).
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3. Oath
Judge Becker has suggested that an oath be administered to
potential disclosees.16 2 Agency lawyers could easily be required to
take a similar oath restraining them from subsequent disclosure or
use of information learned in the grand jury room. This oath
would bolster the contempt provision of rule 6(e) 113 by adding yet
another duty of silence. Although the agency lawyer is unlikely
to "fear that if he swears falsely he will go to hell," 16t the solemnity
of the procedure and the possible consequences of violating a
guarantee of nondisclosure are likely to have a strong deterrent
effect on an attorney. Rather than risk violating this oath, an
agency lawyer might be more careful to avoid involvement with
any investigations by his agency of any of the grand jury witnesses.
4. Reveal Identity
The administrative agency lawyer must be required to reveal
the identity of his real employer, the agency, and also his own
name to each grand jury witness. Only by knowing about the
participation of the agency lawyer in the grand jury can a witness
be alert to possible abuse or tainted evidence when he is later the
subject of an agency investigation. There is evidence that some
agency attorneys already do disclose their affiliation to the wit-
nesses.1 65 This practice should be mandatory.
5. Issue a Protective Order
If the appointment of a lower-level agency lawyer as a special
attorney is deemed necessary to the conduct of a grand jury investi-
gation, the judge should give his consent subject to a protective
order barring that attorney from any role in concurrent or shortly
subsequent civil litigation or regulatory activity undertaken by his
agency involving grand jury witnesses or targets. Such a protec-
tive order need not be permanent but should remain in effect long
162 Hearings, supra note 1, at 31 (testimony of Hon. Edward R. Becker).
1 0 3 FED. R. Cnmi. P. 6(e)(1).
164 Final Report of the Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure,
Presented by the Lord High Chancellor to Parliament (1953), quoted in J.
MACIRE, J. WEINSTEI, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AM MATERALS ON
EVmENCE 2 (1973).
185 United States v. Birdman, No. 78-1940 (3d Cir. June 25, 1979). It is too
late to object that awareness of agency presence will cause the witness to withhold
useful testimony from the grand jury for fear of its civil implication. That was an
argument for not allowing agency assistance in the first place because it reduces
grand jury secrecy and thus inhibits witnesses. Once such assistance becomes
routine, the chilling effect on witnesses is inevitable, and the requirement that
agency attorneys disclose their identity seems harmless and fundamentally fair.
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enough so that the evidence acquired by exposure to the grand
jury proceedings may have grown stale, or, at least, the incentive
to exploit it may have diminished. It is currently the practice for
agency lawyers to request benevolent protective orders before the
grand jury begins by which they hope to eviscerate any successful
challenges by grand jury witnesses or targets to the agency lawyers'
presence.166 The protective orders generally follow rule 6(e) (2)(B),
forbidding the use of information developed in the grand jury in
subsequent civil proceedings. 6 7 Alone, these are clearly inadequate
to protect against sub silentio or inadvertent use of grand jury
information. Although they may have effect in conjunction with
the other proposed rules, the better rule is to forestall the likelihood
of abuse by making an affirmative order that for a specified period
of time, the agency lawyer have no further agency responsibility in
matters regarding the grand jury witnesses. 6 s
Of the proposed rules, the protective order is the most "costly"
in terms of restrictions on agency activity. Yet the IRS has just
revised its manual to include such a prophylactic measure. Part
9267.3(3) states that "service personnel who have received grand
jury information that is subject to the secrecy provisions of Rule
6(e) shall, exclude themselves from involvement in non-grand
jury matters concerning the individuals, entities, and subject mat-
ter of the grand jury information." 169 This provision applies to
Service employees at the highest level of management. Such a rule
may be less feasible in smaller agencies with less manpower or where
a regulated industry is highly concentrated. For example, to bar
the lawyer from dealing with companies representing a significant
proportion of his field of expertise (for example, one of the major
car manufacturers) would be too costly for the agency and would
probably result in the agency's refusal to lend the lawyer to a
grand jury investigation involving that manufacturer. In such a
situation, protective orders such as those currently issued, which
merely forbid subsequent use of the information, might be more
appropriate.
166 Interview with an assistant United States attorney (notes in the possession
of the author). Such challenges may be based on In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260 (7th
Cir. 1978), and In re April 1977 Grand Jury Subpoenas, 573 F.2d 936, rev'd
en bano, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1277 (1979).
167 FED. R. CRImV. P. 6(e)(2)(B).
168 Such a protective order was sorely needed in United States v. Gold, 470 F.
Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979). During the grand jury investigation, the special
assistant to the prosecutor continued to perform functions at EPA affecting the
regulation and administrative investigations of Velsicol, the company under investi-
gation by the grand jury.
169 [1979] 5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) pt. 9267.3(3).
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Still, the need for some protective order is clearly evident in
United States v. Gold,170 in which the EPA attorney, Kennedy,
demonstrated the precise kind of insensitivity to the basic distinc-
tions between agency powers of investigation and those of a grand
jury 171 that requires this rethinking of the policy of access to the
grand jury. In several instances, grand jury evidence was used in
concurrent parallel EPA hearings. For example, Kennedy, who
had actively conducted the examination of witnesses, collaborated
with his agency associates to formulate the theory that was used by
the EPA administrator to reverse the decision of the administrative
law judge. Kennedy never told the Justice Department of this
involvement.172 Further, Kennedy disclosed to his EPA supervisor
the contents of certain incriminating telephone transcripts that he
had obtained pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. This disclosure
was not sanctioned by any court.173 Even after obtaining on another
occasion a court order allowing disclosure to EPA of a document
uncovered by the grand jury, Kennedy continued the abuse by re-
vealing it instead to the administrative law judge conducting the
hearing.174 These examples underscore the need to limit agency
access to grand juries and subsequent use of information there
obtained.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current practice of allowing agency lawyers to conduct
grand jury investigations has been allowed to continue because
courts have misread or misunderstood the purpose and legislative
histories of the 1977 amendments to rule 6(e), providing for access
to grand jury materials, and 28 U.S.C. § 515(a), providing for the
appointment of special assistants to the United States attorney.
Courts have failed to reconcile satisfactorily their broad interpreta-
tion of section 515(a) with the deliberate limitations on access to
grand jury proceedings contained in rule 6(d). Admittedly, the
two sections do not on their faces contradict each other, but no
court has yet addressed the serious expansion of agency powers
which their casual statutory construction implies. As the use of
agency lawyers to conduct grand juries gains acceptance in the
170 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
171See text accompanying notes 22-31 supra.
172 470 F. Supp. at 1347.
173 Findings of Fact at 63 (No. 77-CR-1073) (unpublished).
174 470 F. Supp. at 1350-51.
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wake of decisions such as In re Perlin,175 United States v. Dondich 7 6
and United States v. Birdman,1"7 the benefits of the grand jury's
powerful investigative processes may increasingly accrue to federal
agencies which can exert influence to broaden the grand jury inquiry
beyond the scope of criminal activities and later, intentionally or
inadvertently, use advantageously what was learned in their civil
investigations or administrative regulation. This is contrary to
the long-standing policy of grand jury secrecy and inconsistent with
the statutory scheme enacted by Congress to distinguish administra-
tive investigatory powers from those used to investigate crime.
If agency lawyers are to be allowed into the grand jury room,
they should first be screened by a district judge, who should require
the following:
1. A showing that the agency lawyer is truly needed;
2. A showing that the agency lawyer is not a member of the
-control group" of the agency;
3. An oath that all testimony heard will remain secret;
4. A procedure by which the agency lawyer will reveal his
usual employment to each witness; and
5. That the agency abide by a protective order which should
temporarily bar involvement by the agency lawyer in civil actions
or regulation regarding the grand jury witnesses, or, alternatively,
barring subsequent use of any grand jury testimony.
The imposition of the suggested rules would provide a satisfactory
prophylaxis to grand jury abuse while allowing government re-
sources to be used efficiently.
175 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978).
1'6460 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
177No. 78-1940 (3d Cir. June 25, 1979).
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